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the time of its making. 67 In a case in which the Constitution forbade the taxing of
a municipal corporation for corporation purposes and this prohibition was subsequently changed to allow a tax, the court held that the power of the legislature
to validate by a curative law any proceeding which it might have authorized in
advance is limited to the case of the irregular exercise of power; it cannot cure
the want of authority to act at all.43
In every case, the courts are prone to say that a tax levied in substantial compliance with the law should be sustained, for otherwise no taxes could be held
valid for most proceedings have at least some small defects that could be objected to.6 9
An important practical consideration from the taxpayer's point of view in
the problem of defeating tax levies is whether the end result is worth the expense
of litigation even if he is successful in defeating the levy. The general rule is that
where the illegal part of the tax is inseparably connected with the legal tax, the
entire tax is void. But if the lawful part can be clearly and definitely ascertained
and separated from the unlawful part, the lawful part will be sustained and the
unlawful part will fail.70 The holding of the United States District Court for
Wyoming, 71 to the effect that where an action is brought to enjoin a tax because
it exceeds the statutory or constitutional limitations, only so much of the tax will
be enjoined as exceeds the limit, puts Wyoming in line with the majority on this
point. The consideration of how much money can be recovered is impoitant in
determining whether to go to court or not and would probably restrict these suits
to the large property owners. The answers to this problem may lie in many taxpayers joining together in the same suit to reduce the cost to each one.
THOMAS L. WHITLEY.

REMEDIES FOR DEFECTS IN GENERAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS
IN WYOMING

Under state laws general levies are ordinarily made directly against property
according to value based on some form of assessment. The term assessment, as
commonly employed,) and as used in the Wyoming Constitution2 and statutes
relating to general property taxation, refers to the two processes of listing property to be taxed, and of estimating the sums which are to be the guide in an
apportionment of the tax between the individual subjects of taxation within the
particular taxing unit. The assessment is the first step in the proceedings against
individual subjects of taxation, under such an ad valorem taxation system, and
See note 21 supra.
People v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 310 11. 212, 141 N.E. 822, 823 (1923).
Protest of Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. Co., 149 Oki. 166, 300 Pac. 713 (1931).
Strong v. Mack, 64 C. A. (2d) 739 (Calif.), 149 P. (2d) 401 (1944) ; Dallas County
Levee Improvement Dist. No. 6 v. Hengy, 146 Tex. 95, 202 S.W. (2d) 918 (1947).
71. Cottle v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 201 Fed. 39, 119 C. C. A. 371 (1912), 96 A.L.R. 934.
1. 3 Cooley, Taxation sec. 1044 (4th ed. 1924).
2. "All lands and improvements thereon shall be listed for assessment, valued for taxation and assessed separately . . . " Wyo. Const. Art. 15, Sec. 1.

67.
68.
69.
70.
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is the foundation of all which will follow it. Whether or not an ass,ssment is
legal and valid is a consideration, therefore, of prime importance.
The testing of the validity of assessments in the courts of Wyoming appears
to have been almost exclusively by way of collateral attack, despite the fact that
for the past three decades there has been statutory authorization for direct attack
by way of appeal to the courts from the determinations of assessing officials and
tribunals. Though it is possible that such appeals have been heard at the district
court level, there are no reported cases involving an appeal direct to a court from
the State Board of Equalization. Modes of collateral attack on the assessment
which have been employed in Wyoming3 include actions to enjoin the collection
of the tax, actions to enjoin the sale of the taxpayer's property to satisfy taxes,
actions to recover the amount of taxes paid and actions to quiet title.
The general rule is that a taxpayer complaining of his assessment cannot
resort to the courts in the first instance, but must avail himself of the statutory
remedy of appeal to tribunals empowered to entertain direct attack, unless there
is a showing that such remedy is inadequate, or that the defect in the assessment
is jurisdictional. 4 Where the defect is jurisdictional, as in a case in which an
assessment has been made when the taxpayer has no property in the county subject
to taxation, the taxpayer, in order to be entitled to relief in the courts, need not
allege or prove that he has first made application to the board of equalization to
correct the assessment ;5 the assessment is clearly illegal and collateral attack as
well as direct attack is authorized.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has taken the position that the remedy provided by statute is exclusive, and thus adequate, precluding a collateral attack,
absent a showing of fraudulent conduct invoking the principles of equity.6 The
acts of officers and tribunals upon whom the law imposes the duty of assessment
of property are judicial in nature;7 a court of equity is not a court of errors to
review such acts and it will not revise the decisions of such officers and tribunals
upon matters within their discretion if they have acted honestly.8 Where there is
a difference of opinion as to value, the judgment of a board of equalization, honestly exercised, must prevail.9
Fraud sufficient to invoke the aid of the court is not shown by allegations that
the assessment complained of is excessive, 10 or allegations that the board of equal3. "District courts shall have jurisdiction to enjoin the illegal levy of taxes and assessments, or the collection of either, and of actions to recover back such taxes or
assessments as have been collected; but no recovery shall be had unless the action

be brought within one year after the taxes or assessments are collected."

Wyo.

Comp. Stat. 1945 see. 3-7801.
4. 3 Cooley, Taxation sec. 1201 (4th ed. 1924) ; 4 id. sec. 1650; Stason, Judicial Review of

Tax Errors--Effect of Failure to Resort to Administrative Remedies, 28 Mich.
L. Rev. 637 (1930).

5. Horton v. Driskell, 13 Wyo. 66, 77 Pac. 354, 3 Ann. Cas. 561, (1904) ; Ricketts v.
Crewdson, 13 Wyo. 284, 79 Pac. 1042, rehearing 81 Pac. 1 (1905).
6. Buntan v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n., 29 Wyo. 461, 215 Pac. 244 (1923) ; Ricketts

7.
8.
9.
10.

v. Crewdson, see note 5 supra; Com'rs. v. Searight Cattle Co., 3 Wyo. 777, 31 Pac.
268 (1892) (overruled on a point not material to the subject matter of this article).
Cases cited note 6 supra.
Crewdson v. Nefsy Co., 14 Wyo. 61, 82 Pac. 1 (1905); Ricketts v. Crewdson, see
note 5 supra; Com'rs v. Searight Cattle Co., see note 6 supra.
Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n., see note 6 supra.
Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n., see note 6 supra; Ricketts v. Crewdson,
see note 5 supra.
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ization acted "arbitrarily and without any evidence as to the value of lands of the
plaintiff,")) or that the property has been overvalued due to an error in judgment.1 2 Though the Wyoming statutes contemplate that valuation should be at
true value in money at private sale, 13 and therefore, strictly and logically speaking, property which is assessed at more than its actual value might be said to be
assessed illegally as to the excess, the Supreme Court has said that value is a matter
of opinion; there is no point at which it can be said an excessive valuation begins.
Fraud must be shown.) 4
The most obvious case alleged to involve fraud such as will support a collateral attack on an assessment is one in which there has been a failure to assess the
complainant's property uniformly, i.e., a failure to assess his property as other
comparable property, similarly situated, has been assessed.15 One of the declared
rights in the Wyoming Constitution is that "all taxation shall be equal and uniform."16 The specific, fundamental substantive requirement of the Constitution
relative to the assessment of property for taxation is that all taxable property shall
be uniformly assessed. 17 The collateral attack based on this substantive ground
of discrimination must be predicated on a showing of "an intention, or the equivalent of fraudulent purpose, to disregard the fundamental principle of uniformity," 18 or a showing that the assessment is somehow constructively fraudulent as
against the taxpayer.19 A grossly inequitable and palpably excessive valuation may
be held constructively fraudulent, as showing in itself an intentional injustice or
discrimination. 20
Not every discrimination will render an assessment invalid. It is true that an
omission to assess property subject to taxation is a discrimination against those
taxpayers who have been assessed, increasing the tax burden which they must
carry. However, as the Wyoming Supreme Court has pointed out, it has been
frequently held that an omission to assess property, arising from either a mistake
of law or fact, or accidentally, gives no ground to other taxpayers upon which to
attack the assessment made against them. 2 1 A mere mistake, an accidental discrimination, does not authorize an injunction. 22 In fact, there is good authority
for the proposition that the rule is that an omission to assess, even though intentional, will not affect the validity of the assessment made against other taxpayers
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Ibid. The facts constituting the fraud must be stated.
Rowley v. Chicago &N. W. R. Co., 293 U. S. 102, 55 Sup. Ct. 55, 79, L. Ed. 222 (1934).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 32-506.
Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n., see note 6 supra.
"The uniformity and equality enjoined by the constitution require only that the
same means and methods be applied impartially to all the constituents of each class,
so that it operates equally and uniformly upon all persons and corporations in
similar circumstances." City and County of Denver v. Lewin, 106 Colo. 331, 105
P. (2d) 854, 863 (1940).
Wyo. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 28.
Wyo. Const. Art. 15, Sec. 11.
Rowley v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., see note 12 supra.
Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n., see note 6 supra.
Ibid.
Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n., see note 6 supra; 3 Cooley, Taxation sec.
1162 (4th ed. 1924).
Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n., see note 6 supra.
3 Cooley, Taxation sec. 1162 (4th ed. 1924); Matthews, The Function of Constitutional Provisions Requiring Uniformity in Taxation, 38 Ky. L. J. 188 (1950).
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who have been properly assessed. 2 1 Nor does a mere showing that the property of
others has been undervalued entitle the taxpayer to injunctive relief. 24
Before leaving the discussion of the requirement of uniformity in property
tax assessment it might be well to indicate the relationship, as declared by the
Wyoming Supreme Court, between that requirement and the requirements of law
relative to valuation of property, inasmuch as valuation is the most important
element in the assessment. The Constitution of Wyoming directs that "the legislature shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation
of all property, real and personal." 25 In consequence thereof, legislation has been
passed providing that ".

.

. all real property is to be assessed at its true value in

money at private sale, having regard to its quality, locality, natural advantages,
26
the general improvements in the vicinity, and all other elements of its value."
In the course of its opinion in Bunten v. RoJk Springs Grazing 4ssociation,27 the
Supreme Court said that though the statute limits valuation to the actual value
of the property, "the percent of value at which property is assessed is, after all,
secondary to the Constitutional provision that all taxable property shall be assessed uniformly, so as to bear a just proportion of the burdens of taxes. The
latter is the end, the former the means to that end, and we shall not exalt the less
important over the more important."
Direct attack on an assessment in the courts has been authorized from the
time of the creation of the State Board of Equalization in 1919. At that time,
the legislature provided that the taxpayer should have the right to appeal from a
decision of that board increasing his assessment to the district court of the county
wherein the property was situated. 28 Then, in 1931, legislation was passed to the
effect that any taxpayer feeling aggrieved by an assessment by the board might
appeal from the decision of the board to the district court of the county where
the property was located, a trial de novo to the court to be had there.29 The latter
statute also directed that all the proceedings on appeal to the court were to be under
the provisions of the code of civil procedure, as in other civil cases. The Supreme
Court of Wyoming has not been called upon to determine what the function of
the district court is when appeal is made from the State Board of Equalization to
that court ;30 as was earlier indicated, this method of testing the validity of an

24.
25.
26.
27.
29.
29.
30.

Rowley v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., see note 12 supra.
Wyo. Const. Art. 15, Sec. 11.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 32-506.
29 Wyo. 461, 215 Pac. 244, 253 (1923).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 32-711 (a).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 32-716.
In a 1923 case, the Supreme Court said that in the absence of legislative provision
to the contrary, the courts could not substitute their judgment for that of the persons
and boards specifically provided for the job of assessment. Bunten v. Rock Springs
Grazing Ass'n. see note 6 supra. And, in an early case decided before either of
the statutes under consideration was passed, the court said that absent a provision
regulating the procedure and granting a review by the courts, the court would have
"no revisionary power" over the administrative assessing tribunal, unless fraud
or lack of jurisdiction was shown. Com'rs v. Searight Cattle Co., see note 6 supra.

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

assessment has not been involved in any reported Wyoming case.31 What weight
should be given to the determination of the administrative officials as to the proper
assessment ?32 Should the district court become the assessing tribunal, and determine anew the proper valuation to be assigned to the taxable property? Should
the court determine for itself whether a particular assessment is "excessive," despite the fact that the assessment was made in compliance with the principle of
uniformity? Should the court only hear evidence in order to determine whether
the valuation placed on the property was the result of fraud on the taxpayer, or
was erroneous to the extent that it was constructively fraudulent?
Of course, only the Supreme Court of Wyoming can authoritatively answer
the questions propounded and determine the proper function of the district court
upon such an appeal.3 But, with the hope that some light would be shed on the
possible interpretations which might be placed on the statutes, particularly the
more detailed 1931 statute,34 a search was made for cases from other jurisdictions
involving statutory appeals to the courts from assessing tribunals. Few cases
having validity for the point in interest were discovered; most of the cases found
involved statutes the wording of which was significantly different from that found
in the Wyoming statutes. However, some aid may be gained from the following
decisions.
In Ohio, under a statute empowering the court, to which the appeal was
taken, to proceed de novo, it was held that the court should exercise an independent judgment upon issues of fact and of law, and in case of reversal, it was
not necessary to remand the proceedings to the tax commission for reconsideration
and redetermination. The court might hear the evidence presented to the tax commission and additional evidence, and could modify the assessed value of the property as determined by the tax commission and find the true value in money of the
property.35 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that where the proceedings are de novo in the court to which an appeal from the decision of a tax
assessment board is made, the valuation of the board makes a prima facie case
only, and where the evidence as to market value was in conflict with the board's
31. Possible explanations for the apparent failure of taxpayers to take advantage of
the right of appeal to the district court given them by statute include: (1) the cost
of appealing to the court to get an assessment allegedly erroneous corrected would
be more than the possible benefit to be gained even if the taxpayer were successful,
the saving in taxes being relatively small inasmuch as the error in assessment, if
any, is seldom large in comparison to the actual value of the property; (2) in a
great many cases, the aggrieved taxpayer and the state Board of Equalization are
able to satisfactorily compose their differences before matters reach a point compelling the taxpayer to seek the aid of the court.
32. In interpreting the statute, will the court be decisively influenced by the prevailing
spirit of past decisions of the court-i.e., that to make assessments and to fix valuation
is primarily a function for administrative officers, and not one for the courts?
33. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to decide the question
raised by the contention of a defendant Wyoming county treasurer, in a suit by a
taxpayer to enjoin the collection of taxes, that the taxpayer had failed to exhaust
the statutory administrative remedy open to it by appeal from the determination
of the State Board of Equalization to the district court, saying that it was reluctant,
in advance of a decision on the serious question of Wyoming law presented by the
court of last resort, to construe such a statute of doubtful meaning or to decide
questions of state law as to which there might be substantial controversy. Rowley
v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., see note 11 supra.
34. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 32-716.
35. Tax Commission v. Surface Combustion Corp., 52 Ohio App. 120, 3 N. E. (2d) 546
(1936).
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valuation, the prima facie case was overcome.3 6 It has been held by the Supreme
Court of Washington that, where no practice was fixed in the act which provided
for an appeal to the superior court from an order of the tax commission, the legislature intended that the well established equity practice should be followed.
"Trial de novo" in the court appealed to was limited to mean the trying of the
case anew so far as the introduction of testimony was concerned and the determination of facts was concerned, for the purpose of enabling the trial court to determine whether the valuation placed on the property by the tax commission was
erroneous to the extent that it was actually or constructively fraudulent.37 Under
an Iowa statute authorizing appeals from action taken by the board of review,
the district court is to hear the appeal in equity and determine anew all questions
arising before the board which relate to the liability of the property to assessment
or the amount thereof. In construing the statute, the Supreme Court of Iowa said
that there was a presumption in favor of the valuation fixed by the assessor; the
court would not grant relief from an assessment because of a mere difference in
opinion as to values. If the action oi the assessor "is not arbitrary or capricious or
so wholly out of line with actual values as to give rise to the inference that he has
not properly discharged his duty, the assessment made by him and confirmed by
the board of review should not be disturbed by the courts." 38
Thus far we have considered the possibilities for relief in the courts open to
the taxpayer complaining of his assessment. It has been noted that the courts
will not come to the aid of the taxpayer in a collateral attack on the assessment
unless it can be shown that the administrative remedy afforded him, the right of
appeal to the statutory boards of equalization, is inadequate. A direct attack, of
course, presupposes an adverse determination by the board of equalization.
Rather detailed legislation has been enacted providing for the making of the
original assessment and for the administrative review of assessments. The assessor
is required to gather such data as will better enable him to assess property at its
full cash market value; he is required to "devote himself to a diligent study of
proper valuations, real, personal and mixed in his county. . . ."39 In short, the
statutes contemplate that he will become something of an expert in the field of
appraisal and valuation. After the assessor has returned the assessment, following
his examination of the property and his estimation of its value, a taxpayer feeling
aggrieved by the assessment may appeal to the county board of equalization, which
must hear anyone desiring to make a complaint who files a verified statement
under oath, specifying the respect in which the assessment complained of is incorrect.4 O Unsatisfied with the determination of the county board, the taxpayer may

36. In re Kemble's Estate, 280 Pa. 441, 124 A. 694 (1924).
37. In re Assessment of Metropolitan Building Co., 144 Wash. 469, 258 Pac. 473 (1927).
38. Appeal of Dubuque-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 237 Ia. 1314, 25 N. W. (2d) 327, 328 (1946).
39. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 27-505.
40. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 32-805.
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appeal to the State Board of Equalization. 41 That board is charged by the legislature with the duty of examining into all cases in which it is alleged that property
subject to taxation has been fraudulently or improperly or unequally assessed. 42
The legislature has further directed the State Board of Equalization to prescribe the system or systems of valuation to be utilized by the various counties
throughout the state to the end that all property will be uniformly valued for
assessment and taxation purposes.4. Before considering what the Board has done
in compliance with this direction, perhaps brief notice should be taken of a few
general propositions relative to the problem of valuation. It is ordinarily said
that there are three classes of evidence utilized by appraisers in estimating value:
(1) market data, comparison of similar properties; (2) income, capitalization of
rentals; (3) analysis of reproduction cost. 44 Where inexpensive valuations are
necessary, as is the case in mass appraisals for ad valorem tax purposes, all three
classes of evidence cannot be employed. Complete accuracy in the valuation must
be sacrificed for simplicity.4 5 The important generalization is that the exercise
of judgment as to value must be based on facts.4 6
The State Board has established in the various counties a system of valuing
real estate improvements based on what is popularly called the "Boeckh" (pronounced "Beck") system, which utilizes reproduction cost analysis as evidence
upon which the estimate of value is made.4 7 The policy of the board in administering the formula,4 8 developed under the system thus installed, in its capacity
as the administrative tribunal of final appeal, is to inquire whether the formula
was uniformly applied, i.e. applied to the property of the appellant in the same
way as it was applied to all other property similarly situated. Finding as a fact
that there has been this uniformity of application, the board will not grant relief
to the taxpayer complaining that his improvements have been "improperly" valued
under the formula, that the valuation is too high or that it exceeds the actual
cost of the property, 49 or that the valuation is inaccurate as not having been based
41. "While the law does not specifically provide that a taxpayer may appear before it
(the State Board of Equalization), enter his complaint and be heard, there is nothing denying that right; and such right, since the board is a public board with its
sessions open, should . . . be held to be implied." Baker v. Paxton, 29 Wyo. 500,
215 Pac. 257 (1923).
Rules of Practice of the State Board of Equalization, Rule 9 (1), provide specifically for appeal by any taxpayer who may feel aggrieved by any assessment, after
decision by the county board of equalization.
42. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 32-711 (b).
43. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 32-711 (1).
44. Martin and Estill, Valuation of Property; Economic and Legal Standards, 38 Ky.
L. J. 7 (1949) ; Boeckh, Manual of Appraisals 19 (4th ed. 1945).
45. Ibid.
46. Martin and Estill, supra note 44, at 27.
47. "Appraisers generally agree that the most reliable method of determining the structural value of a building is to compute the cost of replacing the building and then
depreciate this cost for past use. This brings values up to the present time.... This
is applicable to both farms and city residences and to most classes of city business
property." Martin and Estill, supra note 44, at 20.
48. Roughly, the formula is: 60% of replacement cost of 1938, with allowance for
depreciation and for obsolescence .
The general practice in taxing districts is to assess property at less than its full
value. Uniformity requires a similar debasement of all property. Matthews, supra
note 22, at 196.
49. See Muehlenkamp, Remedies for Disproportionate Tax Assessment in Kentucky,
36 Ky. L. J. 401 (1948).
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on a formula which takes into account a factor of value such as the income producing quality of the property.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has not been called on to decide directly the
question whether it is sufficient to support a valid assessment merely that some
reasonable class of evidence has been utilized to give a comparatively sound factual
basis for the estimate of the value of the property assessed and that the system as
thus constituted be uniformly applied. However, judging from the general tone
of the decisions of the court which exalt the requirement of uniformity in assessment to the position of paramount importance, and in view of the generally accepted principles relative to the appraisal of property for taxation discussed earlier,
it would not be unreasonable to suppose that the court would uphold the policy
adopted by the State Board of Equalization in its administration of the real estate
improvement valuation system.
Having dealt with principles applicable to cases involving substantive defects
in an assessment, we now turn to a consideration of defects in the procedure followed in making the assessment.
The person assessed must at some stage in the proceedings have notice and
opportunity to be heard as to the validity and amount of the tax against him
before the tax becomes final in order that the requirements of due process of law
be met. 50 Opportunity for a hearing in respect to excessive valuation caused by
a mistake of judgment must be piovided.51 If sufficient notice and hearing is not
afforded, the tax is void and the taxpayer may proceed with a collateral attack
without regard for administrative appeals. 52 Where an assessment was made
under a statute53 which provided that the county treasurer could assess property
which had escaped the assessor and the board of equalization, and the statute
failed to make provision for the taxpayer to be heard in any manner, the board
of equalization having adjourned for the year, the assessment was held invalid. 54
However, due process does not require personal notice be given of the meeting
of the board of equalization for the purpose of hearing complaints; it is sufficient
that the taxpayer is informed of the hearing by some general law which fixes the
time and place of the meeting, and of which he must take notice.55 Apart from
this, it should be noted that the Wyoming statutes56 set out in detail notice and
hearing requirements where an individual assessment is altered by any one of the
assessing authorities.
When the State Board of Equalization undertakes to perform its duty to
equalize values, no notice need be given where the board increases the valuation
by percentage of a class, or of classes, of property, such horizontal increase affect50. Baker v. Paxton, 29 Wyo. 500, 215 Pac. 257 (1923); 3 Cooley, Taxation sec. 1113
(4th ed. 1924).
51. Orcutt v. Crawford, 85 F. (2d) 146 (C. C. A. 10th 1936), cert. denied 299 U. S. 594.
52. Stason, supra note 4, at 650.
53. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 32-522.
54. Orcutt v. Crawford, see note 51 supra.
55. 3 Cooley, Taxation sec. 1113 (4th ed. 1924). See Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sees.
32-801, 32-902.
56. Wyo. Comp. Stat. sees. 27-505, 27-511 (assessor) ; Wyo. Comp. Stat. sees. 32-803,
32-804 (county board of equalization); Wyo. Comp. Stat. sec. 32-711 (a) (State
Board of Equalization.
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ing a comparatively large number of people.57 The presumption arises that, after
two meetings of the county board of equalization, and at the time the assessment
role is laid before the State Board, the various owners of classes of property in the
county stand on an equal footing and that as between themselves, the valuations
of their respective properties have been fully equalized. 58 Where the statute fixes
the date and place of meeting of the State Board, as is the case in Wyoming, all
persons interested must take notice that the power of the board to equalize must
be exercised at that time and place, and that his property may be affected thereby.59
Also, the rule is well recognized, that absent a statutory requirement to act
on evidence, and there is no such requirement in Wyoming, boards of equalization
when equalizing values act upon their own knowledge. 6 0 It is reasonable to presume that members of the board obtain a fair idea of taxable values in the state
in the performance of statutory duties, and hence the legislature deemed it unnecessary that they should act upon evidence produced before them in equalizing
values. 6 1
The statute62 authorizing the county board of equalization to add property
to the assessment roll, and assess its value, does not require the board to hear
evidence as a condition precedent to thus correcting the assessment roll. Members
of the board can act on personal knowledge, or they may gain information upon
which to act from any source at their command. 6 3
Some particular defect in the procedure followed in making the assessment
is frequently seized upon in an attempt to have the assessment declared invalid,
and thus the tax or the tax title, for which a legal assessment is an indispensible
prior step. Requirements relative to the assessment procedure, set forth in the
statutes, are ordinarily classified as either mandatory or directory. "When the
requirements are intended for the protection of the citizen and to prevent a sacrifice of his property and a disregard thereof might and generally would affect him
injuriously, they are considered mandatory. But where the statutory requisitions
are intended as a guide for officers ... and are designated to secure order, system
and dispatch in proceedings, a disregard of them cannot injuriously affect the
rights of parties interested, and hence they are generally considered as directory,
and a non-compliance therewith does not render the tax illegal or void."64 A

57. Baker v. Paxton, see note 50 supra; Bi-metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of
Equalization, 239 U. S. 441, 35 Sup. Ct. 141, 60 L. Ed. 372 (1915).
58. Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n., see note 6 supra; Baker v. Paxton, see
note 50 supra.
59. Baker v. Paxton, see note S0 supra.
60. Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n, see note 6 supra; Ricketts v. Crewdson, see
note 5 supra; 3 Cooley, Taxation sec. 1224 (4th ed. 1924).
61. Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n., see note 6 supra.
62. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 32-802.
63. Ricketts v. Crewdson, see note 5 supra.
64. Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n., see note 6 supra. See, generally, 2 Cooley,
Taxation sec. 510 (4th ed. 1924).
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failure to comply with a mandatory requirement will render the assessment void,
as where the assessment was not made in the name of the owner. 65
However, in determining the question as to whether a particular requirement
is mandatory or only directory, the courts appear to be considerably influenced by
the nature of the proceeding in which the question is raised. If the proceeding is
one in which it is sought to sustain tax titles or sales for taxes, it is generally held
that the requirements of the statutes must be substantially complied with, and
the assessment must be made in the manner required. 66 "But when equitable relief
is sought the maxim is applied that he who seeks equity must do equity, and an
injunction will not be allowed on account of the mere failure of the taxing officers
to fulfill the requirements of the statute in levy and assessment, but it must appear
that the tax itself is inequitable for the reason that the property was not taxable,
or that it was not the property of the complainant, or the like."6 7 The writ of injunction is properly invoked only in extraordinary cases.
Thus, where the oath of the assessor is required to be attached to the assessment roll, 68 and the assessor fails in this duty, the omission renders the assessment
69
The
roll void as a basis for the proceedings of sale and invalidates the tax sale.
court said that an oath of this kind was for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of taxpayers. But where the case was one in which injunctive relief was
sought, the omission to attach the oath to the assessment roll was regarded only
as an irregularity which did not invalidate the assessment, there having been no
0
finding that the tax was for any reason unequal, unjust or inequitable.7 In a case
in which the statutory oath was fixed to the assessment roll and signed by the
assessor, but the oath was not taken before any officer authorized to administer
oaths, the omission was held to render the assessment roll void as a basis for the
7
proceedings of tax sale and invalidated the sale. 1
Likewise, where the description of the real property assessed is not "sufficient
to identify it," as required by statute,72 or there is a misdescription, the assessment
will be said to be void when the validity of a tax sale is called into question as not
having complied with the statute. 7 3 But where it is sought to enjoin the collection
of the tax, a "mere misdescription" of the lands in the assessment thereof will not
render the assessment void, entitling the taxpayer to the relief sought, without a
showing that the valuation of the land is excessive for that actually owned by
65. McCarthy v. Union Pac. R. R., 58 Wyo. 308, 131 P. (2d) 326 (1942); Ohio Oil Co.
v. Wyo. Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P. (2d) 773 (1947) ; Heckt v. Boughton, 2 Wyo.
385 (1881) (assessment made in name of the husband instead of the grantee, his wife).
The term "owner", so far as real estate is concerned, means owner of record. Wyo.
Comp. Stat. sec. 27-505 requires the county assessor to examine records as to
transfers of realty and personal property and make such a record of transfers
as will better enable him to assess all property to the rightful owner.
66. Brewer v. Kulien, 42 Wyo. 314, 294 Pac. 777 (1930) ; 3 Cooley, Taxation sec. 1172
(4th ed. 1924).
67. Horton v. Driskell, 13 Wyo. 66, 77 Pac. 354, 3 Ann. Cas. 561 (1904). Also, see
Carton v. Com'rs, 10 Wyo. 416, 69 Pac. 1013 (1902).
68. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 27-505.
69. Brewer v. Kulien, see note 66 supra.
70. Horton v. Driskell, see note 67 supra.
71. U. S. v. Klink, 3 F. Supp. 208 (D. Wyo. 1933).
72. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 32-510.
73. Electroylic Copper Co. v. Rambler Consolidated Mines Corp., 34 Wyo. 304, 243
Pac. 126 (1926).
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the complainant. 74 In a case of the latter type, the owner must be prejudiced in
some way or mislead by the mistake in the description before he can complain of
the assessment.
ROaERT A.

McKAY.

GRoss PRODUCTS TAX
According to the weight of authority, a tax imposed on persons for severing
natural resources from the soil, based upon either the quantity or the value of the
product severed, is valid. Such a tax, according to the majority view, is a privilege
or occupation tax and not subject to the constitutional requirements relating to
the imposition of property taxes.1
In Wyoming, a tax upon mineral products has been specifically provided for
by the State Constitution.2 This provision expressly gives the legislature power
to impose a tax upon all mines and mining claims, based upon the gross products
thereof. It further provides that this tax is to be in lieu of all taxes on the lands
upon which the mine is located. The tax is to be levied only while the mines are
being worked or operated and should be in addition to any tax which may be
assessed upon the surface improvements of the claim. 3
The question arises in Wyoming, under the Constitutional and statutory
provisions referred to,1 as to what the nature of the tax upon mine products may
be. The question first arose in Miller v. Buck Creek Oil Co.,5 where it was stated
that the tax is evidently a property tax rather than a license, privilege or occupation tax. However, the discussion by the court on this point was merely by way
of dictum and by no means conclusive, which fact was recognized when the issue
arose for the second time in the Federal Court.6 In referring to the Buck Creek
case, the court was of the opinion that the Wyoming Supreme Court leans toward
the doctrine announced by so many other courts, that minerals when severed from
the land become personal property and are taxable as such.7 Perhaps this is a
logical conclusion in view of the holding in the Buck Creek case that a portion of
the products tax should be paid by the lessee of the property, which indicates that
the tax is upon the property after it becomes severed from the land.
The latest and most conclusive argument holding the gross products tax to be
a personal property tax was set forth in Board of Com'rs of Sweetwater County,
Wyo., et al. v.*Bernardin et al.R In this case, it was urged that the gross products
tax was a tax on the realty measured by the gross mineral product thereof. It was
here pointed out 9 that if this were true, the amended section of the gross products
74. Ricketts v. Crewdson, see note 5 supra.
1. 32 A.L.R. 827.

2. Wyo. State Const. Art. 15, sec. 3.
3. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 32-1001.

4. Ibid. 2 and 3.
5. 38 Wyo. 505, 269 Pac. 43 (1928).
6. First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Central Coal & Coke Co. et al., 3 F. Supp. 433
(D. Wyo. 1933).
7. Ibid at 436.
8.74 F. (2d) 809 (D. Wyo. 1934).
9. Ibid at 813.

